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2A-09/21/92 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BUFFALO TEACHERS FEDERATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11506 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Respondent. 
ROBERT D. CLEARFIELD, GENERAL COUNSEL (ROBERT W. 
KLINGENSMITH, JR. of counsel), for Charging Party 
JOSEPH CARNEY, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Buffalo 
Teachers Federation, Inc. (BTF) to a decision by an Administrative 
Law Judge (AKT). The BTF alleges in its charge that the Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of Buffalo 
(District) violated §209-a.l(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Public 
Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) by repudiating the parties' 
contractual grievance procedure by intentionally and systematically 
delaying the processing of grievances. After a hearing, the ALT 
granted the District's motion to dismiss, which was made at the close 
of the BTF's direct case. The ALJ held that the evidence did not 
show that the District had abandoned the grievance procedure or 
otherwise treated it as a nullity and, therefore, that there was no 
repudiation. 
U-11506 - Board -2 
BTF argues in its exceptions that the ALT erred factually and 
legally in dismissing the charge pursuant to the District's motion. 
BTF argues that the record evidences a pervasive pattern of delay 
attributable to the District in the scheduling or rescheduling of 
grievance meetings at appellate stages of the grievance procedure 
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. The District has not 
filed a response to the exceptions. 
For the following reasons we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
BTF's theory of violation rests on an alleged repudiation of the 
contractual grievance procedure. In several decisions,- we have 
distinguished a contract repudiation, which is cognizable as an 
improper practice, from a contract breach or a contract enforcement, 
which is not. In making that distinction, we have emphasized that a 
meritorious repudiation claim arises only in "extraordinary 
circumstances"-7 in which a party to the contract denies the 
existence of an agreement or acts in total disregard of the 
contract's terms without any colorable claim of right.-7 In the 
one case in which we held that an employer had repudiated the 
contract grievance procedure, the record established that the 
employer wholly ignored the grievance procedure to the point of 
^State of New York fSUNY College at Potsdam^. 22 PERB fl3 045, 
at 3103 (1989). 
^Monticello Cent. School Dist. , 22 PERB J[3002 (1989) ; Connetquot 
Cent. School Dist.. 21 PERB f3049 (1988); City of Buffalo, 
19 PERB f3023 (1986); Copiaque Union Free School Dist., 
13 PERB 53081 (1980). 
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abandonment and deliberately treated that procedure as a nullity.-7 
The record in this case considered in the light most favorable to the 
BTF falls far short of that repudiation standard. The District is 
processing grievances, it has made efforts to expedite that processing, 
and it has tried to clear the grievance backlog. Although the pace of 
processing may still be slower than the BTF might prefer, certain of 
its own actions have contributed to some of the delays and, in any 
event, the processing speed is not wholly unreasonable given the number 
of grievances filed annually and the several steps through which a 
grievance is passed. In summary, the evidence does not establish the 
intentional disregard of the grievance process which is necessary to a 
viable repudiation cause of action. Therefore, the AKT did not err in 
dismissing BTF's charge at the close of its case. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is affirmed 
and the exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: September 21, 1992 
Albany, New York 
<$A:,. ^U„t\._ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, 
Eric/J. Schmertz, Member 
^Addison Cent. School Dist. , 17 PERB f3 076, aff 'a 17 PERB J[4566 
(1984) . 
2B-09/21/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY ASSOCIATION OP PATROL OFFICERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3682 
COUNTY OF ERIE and ERIE COUNTY SHERIFF, 
Joint Employer, 
-and-
TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 2 64, 
Intervener = 
SAPERSTON & DAY, P.C. (THOMAS S. GILL of counsel), 
for Petitioner 
DONALD EHINGER, for Joint Employer 
RONALD L. JAROS, ESQ., for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County 
Association of Patrol Officers (CAPO) to a decision by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director). The Director dismissed CAPO's petition which seeks 
to fragment an existing unit of sheriff's department employees 
employed jointly by the County of Erie (County) and the Erie 
County Sheriff (Sheriff) (collectively Employer). CAPO seeks to 
represent in a separate unit all road patrol deputies, including 
criminal deputies and ranking officers assigned to road patrol 
Board - C-3 682 -2 
services, who are presently included in a unit which is 
represented by Teamsters, Local 264 (Local 264). 
In dismissing the petition, the Director found insufficient 
evidence of the type of conflict of interest or inadequate 
representation we have required to warrant fragmentation of an 
existing unit.-7 
CAPO makes two basic arguments in support of its exceptions. 
The first argument is that Local 264 discriminated against and 
failed to represent the road patrol deputies by adopting and 
maintaining a negotiating strategy which sought to obtain wage 
parity for all deputies despite a wage offer from the Employer 
which would have paid the road patrol deputies more than other 
unit deputies. Second, CAPO argues that fragmentation should be 
granted in recognition of the road patrol's separate community of 
interest because the Employer took a neutral position on the 
appropriate uniting. In this latter respect, CAPO argues that 
Local 2 64's opposition to the fragmentation should be disregarded 
because it is not an interested party. 
Local 264 argues in response that the Director's decision is 
factually and legally correct and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and the parties' arguments, we 
affirm the Director's decision. 
-'See, e.g., State of New York (Long Island Park, Recreation and 
Historical Preservation Comm'n) , 22 PERB 53043 (1989) . 
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CAPO filed a petition to fragment road patrol deputies from 
the existing unit in May 1988. By decision dated October 31, 
1989, we affirmed the Director's decision dismissing that 
petition.-7 In our decision, we denied fragmentation based upon 
the alleged uniqueness of the road patrol even though the 
Employer was similarly neutral in that proceeding. There being 
no relevant demonstrated change in factual basis or other 
circumstances in relevant respect since the date of our last 
decision, we consider our decision in that earlier proceeding to 
be dispositive of CAPO's second exception. 
Relevant to the consideration of the CAPO's first exception 
is the parties' unanimous recognition that all deputies were 
underpaid in comparison to others in similar positions elsewhere. 
In response to this underpayment, Local 264 sought to raise the 
salaries of all deputies in the unit by approximately 23%. 
Although it wanted to maintain wage parity until that goal was 
obtained to avoid internal "whipsawing", Local 264 told 
representatives of the road patrol that it would be willing 
thereafter to consider different wage rates for the road patrol 
and other deputies. When contract negotiations deadlocked and 
the fact finder's report issued, the County Executive recommended 
to the County Legislature a one-year imposition which effectively 
would have given the road patrol a 12% pay increase and other 
deputies a 5.3% increase. Thereafter, however, a three-year 
^22 PERB 53055, aff'cr 22 PERB ^4036 (1989) (appeal filed). 
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contract was reached providing all deputies a 23% pay increase 
over its term. 
CAPO argues that Local 2 64's wage parity strategy is 
inherently unfair to the road patrol, who are more underpaid, 
comparatively-,to the other deputies in the unit. CAPO also 
finds discrimination in Local 264's rejection of the wage offer 
actually made by the Employer. We cannot, however, fragment 
units on the basis that some within a unit could or would at a 
particular point in time establish a comparatively greater 
entitlement to increases or other benefits if they were permitted 
separate negotiations. Such claims have often formed the basis 
for fragmentation requests. They have just as regularly-been 
denied in recognition of and adherence to the Act's preference 
for the continuation of the uniting status quo absent a 
compelling need for change. 
We view our decision in State of New York (Loner Island Park 
and Historical Preservation Commission)-7 when applied to the 
facts of this case to be dispositive of CAPO's first exception. 
As there, we do not find established here Local 264's "systematic 
and intentional disregard"-7 for the road patrol nor neglect or 
indifference to their collective interests. We note, however, 
that although we are cognizant of and sensitive to the "realities 
-'Supra note 1. 
^22 PERB ^3043, at 3099 (1989). 
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of the collective negotiation process",-/ our uniting policy 
will not require the continuation of a bargaining unit in 
circumstances in which the interests of a particular subgroup are 
disregarded or ignored out of hand. If Local 264 is to preserve 
its present unit, it must remain responsive within reason to the 
interests of all in its unit. Were we to detect a pattern in 
which the road patrol's interests were routinely subordinated to 
the interests of the majority, we would be inclined to reconsider 
a petition for fragmentation. At present, however, we do not 
find evidence of such a pattern and, for that reason, we must 
deny the petition. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Director's decision is 
affirmed and the exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 21, 1992 
Albany, New York 
S/ld. 
2C-09/21/92 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOHN J. CULKIN, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11413 
STATE OP NEW YORK (STATE INSURANCE FUND), 
Respondent. 
JOHN J. CULKIN, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
John J. Culkin requests that we consider his objection to a 
ruling made by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in July 1992 
during the processing of a charge against the State of New York 
(State Insurance Fund) (State).-' The ALJ currently assigned to 
the case reaffirmed a different AU's-7 earlier ruling that only 
the allegation in the charge regarding an unsatisfactory job 
rating could be processed because the other allegations of 
impropriety raised in the charge are untimely. Culkin argues to 
us that these other allegations are timely and should be heard 
together with the allegation regarding the unsatisfactory rating. 
-''The charge was filed by the Public Employees Federation on 
behalf of Culkin. When PEF withdrew from its prosecution of the 
charge, the ALJ permitted Culkin to intervene and to continue 
with the prosecution of the charge. 
-'The current ALJ was substituted for the ALJ originally assigned 
who has left employment with the Board. 
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Pursuant to §204.7(h) of PERB's Rules of Procedure, review 
of the ALJ's ruling may be had at this point in the proceedings 
only with our express authorization. We conclude that the ALJ's 
ruling can be properly reviewed on exceptions or cross-exceptions 
to the ALJ's decision and order when it is rendered and that no 
extraordinary basis has been established for review of the ALJ's 
timeliness ruling at this time. In such circumstances, we will 
not entertain an interlocutory appeal.-7 Accordingly, we 
decline to consider Culkin's objections at this stage of the 
proceedings. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: September 21, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Che airperson 
WalterJL. Eisenberg, Member 
5/State of New York (Div. of Parole) and Council 82, AFSCME, 
25 PERB 1[3007 (1992) ; United Univ. Professions, 19 PERB ^3009 
(1986). 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RICHARD W. GLASHEEN, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12818 
SUFFOLK COUNTY and SUFFOLK COMMUNITY 
COLLEGE, 
Respondents. 
RICHARD W. GLASHEEN, pro se 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (RICHARD K. ZUCKERMAN of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Richard W. 
Glasheen to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) on a charge he filed 
against his employer, Suffolk County and Suffolk Community 
College (respondents). Glasheen alleges that the respondents 
violated §209-a.l(a), (b) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by deliberately failing to execute a 
contract-' reached with Glasheen7s bargaining agent, the Guild 
-
7The contract, covering the period from September 1, 1988 
through October 31, 1991, was reached in late 1989. It appears 
from the exceptions and the response that the contract was signed 
in December 1991. 
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of Administrative Officers (Guild), to prevent him from pursuing 
a grievance he had filed and to dissuade others from filing 
grievances. -1 
The Director dismissed Glasheen7s charge because, despite 
several amendments in response to notices that the charge was 
deficient, he concluded that there were no facts alleged from 
which it could reasonably be concluded that the respondents 
refrained from signing the contract to interfere with either 
Glasheen's or others' protected rights to pursue contract 
grievances. 
Glasheen argues in his exceptions that the Director's 
decision should be reversed. The respondents argue in their 
response that the Director correctly dismissed the charge. 
Glasheen has filed a reply to the respondent's response, which 
the respondents contend is not permitted by our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules). The respondents have, however, filed a sur 
reply for our consideration should Glasheen's reply be 
considered. Glasheen, in turn, has filed a reply to the 
respondents' sur reply. 
Our Rules do not specifically permit a reply to a response 
to exceptions. The Board, however, will consider a reply to a 
-'In summarizing Glasheen's allegations, we do not suggest that 
he has any standing to pursue the respondents' alleged violation 
of the rights of other employees. Our disposition of the charge 
makes it unnecessary for us to reach this issue. 
Board - U-12818 -3 
response to exceptions under limited circumstances.-7 The 
respondents' response to Glasheen's exceptions, however, does not 
raise any new facts or arguments which Glasheen could not 
reasonably have anticipated. We will not permit a reply to a 
response to exceptions under such circumstances and, therefore, 
we have not considered Glasheen's or the respondents' various 
replies-7 in our disposition of Glasheen's exceptions.-7 
Having reviewed Glasheen's exceptions and the respondents' 
response, we affirm the Director's dismissal of the charge. In 
reviewing Glasheen's charge, it is clear that he is concerned 
with the effects the absence of a signed contract might have upon 
his grievance. It is also clear that Glasheen believes that his 
grievance was not processed expeditiously and that disciplinary 
action taken against him was inappropriate. Glasheen's concerns 
and complaints in these respects do not mean, however, that an 
improper practice charge is the appropriate means by which they 
should be redressed. A delay in the execution of a contract is, 
of course, cognizable under a refusal to bargain charge filed by 
the bargaining agent. Notably, however, the Guild has not 
-
7See Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the City of New 
York. 16 PERB 53048, at 3072 n.l (1992). 
-
7The number of replies filed in this case suggests the need for 
a rule change which would clarify the limitations which are 
appropriately placed upon the exchange of pleadings in order to 
avoid a perceived need for continuing rebuttals of supplemental 
arguments. 
-
7There is, however, nothing in these papers which would change 
our disposition of Glasheen's exceptions. 
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charged that the respondents' delayed execution of the agreement 
violates their statutory duty to bargain. Even if Glasheen had 
the standing to pursue such a charge, his allegation of violation 
is of a different type. Glasheen7s allegation is that the 
respondents' failure to execute the agreement was improperly 
motivated as a means to deprive him and others of the opportunity 
to process grievances. However, as the Director correctly 
observed, there are no facts set forth in the charge as filed, 
clarified or amended which, if proven, would establish that the 
respondents deliberately delayed the execution of a formal 
collective bargaining contract to deny Glasheen or other 
employees an opportunity to file or pursue grievances. To the 
contrary, Glasheen himself concludes his charge with the 
allegation that the delay was "engineered" by the respondents to 
protect the reputations of their "key management personnel". 
Even assuming this allegation to be true, it would not establish 
or evidence a violation of the Act. Glasheen's remaining 
allegations are equally conclusory or unrelated to matters 
regulated by the Act. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is 
affirmed and the exceptions are denied. 
Board - U-12818 -5 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 21, 1992 
Albany, New York 
2E-09/21/92 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GREENLAWN FIRE DISTRICT EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U--1-3-223 
GREENLAWN FIRE DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
DOUGLAS K. MC NALLY, ESQ., for Charging Party 
KAUFMAN, NANESS, SCHNEIDER £ ROSENSWEIG, P.C. 
(CLIFFORD P. CHAIET of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the 
Greenlawn Fire District Employees Association (Association) 
to a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director). The charge, filed on 
February 7, 1992, alleges, as amended, that the Greenlawn 
Fire District (District) violated §209-a.l(a), (b), (c) and 
(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
paying one firehouse attendant in the Association's 
bargaining unit substantially more than other unit employees 
in the same title and by refusing during negotiations to 
bargain the Association's demand for equal pay for all such 
employees. 
U-13223 - Board 
The Director dismissed the first aspect of the charge 
as untimely-7 because the payment of the salary 
differential in question predated the Association's 
recognition, in September 1991, by at least nine months and 
continued unchallenged for more than four months after the 
Association's recognition. The Director dismissed the 
second aspect of the charge because the Association's 
allegations did not evidence a refusal to negotiate in good 
faith regarding the Association's demand for the elimination 
of the wage differential. 
The Association's exceptions focus on the second aspect 
of its charge. It is unclear whether it excepts to the 
Director's disposition of the first aspect of the charge. 
Assuming, however, that the Association's exceptions extend 
to the Director's dismissal of the allegation concerning the 
payment of a higher wage to one employee, we affirm the 
Director's dismissal. That aspect of the charge is plainly 
untimely whether the alleged misconduct is measured from the 
date the wage differential was first established or first 
maintained after the Association's recognition. 
-'•'Section 204.1(a)(1) of PERB's Rules of Procedure requires that 
an improper practice charge be filed within four months of the 
alleged misconduct. 
U-1322 3 - Board 
We similarly affirm the Director's dismissal of the 
second aspect of the charge. As the Director correctly 
noted, the Association's own pleading sets forth that the 
District explained its reasons for wanting to maintain the 
wage differential. Although the Association does not 
consider those reasons to be correct or reasonable, the 
parties' disagreement in this regard relates to the 
respective merits of their positions, which are not for us 
to judge in the context of this charge. Although the 
Association appears to believe otherwise, the District was 
not obliged to accept its demand to eliminate the wage 
differential to satisfy its duty to bargain. To the 
contrary, the duty to bargain as defined specifically 
provides that it does not compel agreement to any particular 
proposal or the making of a concession.-7 Other than the 
refusal to accede to the Association's demand, there is 
nothing set forth in the charge which would evidence a 
refusal to bargain in good faith and, therefore, the 
Director properly dismissed it.-7 
27Act §204.3. 
-
7Whether equal pay is otherwise required by the state or federal 
constitutions, different statute or public policy is immaterial 
to the disposition of this charge. 
U-13223 - Board -4 
For the reasons set forth above, the Association's 
exceptions are denied and the Director's decision is 
affirmed. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, 
and hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 21, 1992 
Albany, New York 
K»J..L IC^rv^jl 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
alter L. Eisenberg, Member ~T 
Eric/J'. Schmertz, MeAber 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11993 
STATE OF NEW YORK - UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11997 
STATE OF NEW YORK - UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
Respondent. 
NANCY HOFFMAN, ESQ., GENERAL COUNSEL (WILLIAM HERBERT 
of counsel), for Charging Party in Case No. U-11993 
SCHLACHTER & MAURO (DAVID SCHLACHTER Of counsel), for 
Charging Party in Case No. U-11997 
NORMA MEACHAM, ESQ. (LEONARD KERSHAW Of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc. Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) and the Suffolk County Court Employees Association, Inc. 
(Association) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 
Board - U-11993 and U-11997 -2 
The ALJ held on a stipulated record that the State of New York -
Unified Court System (UCS) had not violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it changed the 
promotion units for the unified court system, including those for 
the employees represented by CSEA and the Association. The ALJ 
held that Matthew Crosson, Chief Administrator of the Courts, was 
acting in a civil service capacity when he issued an adminis-
trative order which abolished the existing promotion units for 
the New York City courts and the third through the tenth judicial 
districts and created in their place a single promotion unit, 
excluding the promotion units for the Court of Appeals and the 
four Appellate Divisions, which were not changed. 
Both CSEA and the Association argue that the change in the 
promotion units is mandatorily negotiable and that the ALJ erred 
in concluding otherwise. UCS argues in response that the 
determination of promotion units is either a prohibited or 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation for several different reasons 
such that the ALJ's decision must be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and the parties' arguments, we 
affirm the ALT's decision to dismiss the charges, although on a 
different basis. 
Promotion units are basically geographic subdivisions of the 
unified court system within which employees are tested, ranked 
Board - U-11993 and U-11997 -3 
and selected for promotion.-' Until the change at issue, the 
names of employees who achieved a passing score on a promotion 
examination were entered on a general eligible list in the order 
of their examination ratings. Separate eligible lists were 
created for each promotion unit. Employees on the separate 
promotion eligible lists were certified for promotional positions 
within those promotion units before those on the general eligible 
list, even though they may have had a lower score on the 
examination than employees on the general eligible list. Only 
when the pool of eligibles on each separate promotion list was 
exhausted were the employees on the general eligible list 
certified for appointment to a position within a particular 
promotion unit. In principal net effect, the creation of a 
single promotion unit for all courts and court-related agencies, 
excluding the Court of Appeals and the Appellate Divisions, 
causes all employees within and without CSEA's and the 
Association's units to compete for promotion against a greater 
number of employees than when there were many separate promotion 
units. 
We are of the opinion that the Chief Administrator's 
redefinition of promotion units within the unified court system 
-''The parties' contracts use a promotion unit for additional 
purposes. For example, CSEA's agreements use a promotion unit as 
a reference for defining employees' rights for purposes such as 
reassignments, transfers, sick leave donation and reappointments 
following a leave of absence. Promotion units also have 
relevance to the transfer and reassignment of employees under the 
Rules of the Chief Judge. 
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is a nonmandatory subject of negotiation because the decision is 
inextricably intertwined with the exercise of managerial 
prerogatives relating to the determination of employment 
qualifications and staff deployment. Having so found, it is not 
necessary for us to reach the issue of whether the redefinition 
of the promotion units is nonmandatory for the reasons specified 
in the ALJ's decision. 
A promotion unit is basically the means by which the 
nonjudicial employees of the unified court system are screened, 
ranked and selected for positions within the court system. By 
redefining the promotion units, the pool of employees eligible 
for promotion and reassignment was expanded because the new 
promotion unit covered a larger geographic area and eligible 
employee population. We cannot separate the decision to 
reconfigure the promotion unit from other decisions involving, 
directly or indirectly, the establishment of or changes in 
qualifications for appointment or promotion, which we have held 
to be nonmandatory.-7 Consistent with those cases and others, 
we view the basic decision to change the definition of a 
promotion unit for the unified court system to be the type of 
"personnel management tool" which facilitates UCS' determinations 
regarding staffing needs, deployment and job qualifications, all 
g/Rensselaer City School Dist.. 13 PERB ^3051 (1980), conf'd, 87 
A.D.2d 711, 15 PERB 5[7003 (3d Dep't 1982); Fairview Professional 
Firefighters Ass'n, Inc. , 12 PERB J[3083 (1979) ; Police Benevolent 
Ass'n of Hempstead, N.Y. , Inc., 11 PERB [^3072 (1978) . 
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nonmandatory subjects of negotiation.-7 To compel negotiation 
of the definition of the appropriate promotion unit would impinge 
upon UCS's managerial rights in these areas. As such, the Chief 
Administrator's redefinition of the promotion units was not 
mandatorily negotiable and the UCS did not violate the Act when 
the Chief Administrator unilaterally issued and implemented the 
administrative order which effected the change in the promotion 
units. 
Our determination is confined to the charges as filed which 
challenge only the decision to change the promotion units. As 
CSEA and the Association argue, the change in those promotion 
units may have affected certain terms and conditions of 
employment established by the parties' contracts or practices. 
We express no opinion regarding CSEA's or the Association's 
rights to bargain the effects of the change in the promotion 
units pursuant to demand, or the merits of any contract grievance 
or any other action or proceeding which might lie as a result of 
the change in promotion units. In affirming the ALT we hold only 
that the change in the promotion units is not itself mandatorily 
negotiable. 
-'New York State Court Employees Ass'n, 12 PERB J[3075 (1979), 
rev'd in part sub nom. Evans v. Newman, 71 A.D.2d 240, 12 PERB 
H7022 (3d Dep't 1979), aff'd, 49 N.Y.2d 904, 13 PERB [^7004 
(1980). 
Board - U-11993 and U-11997 
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For the reasons set forth above, the AKT's decision 
dismissing the charges is affirmed and the exceptions in each 
case are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charges must be, and 
hereby are, dismissed in their entirety. 
DATED: September 21, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Ch airperson 
Walter!. Eisenberg, Member £ 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Schenectady County Local 847, Burnt Hills-Ballston Lake CSD Unit 
(CSEA) to a decision by the Assistant Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director). 
The Assistant Director held that the Burnt Hills-Ballston Lake 
Central School District (District) violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) when it transferred 
to nonunit personnel certain duties which were performed 
exclusively by the unit position of computer operator. The 
District abolished that position, which was held by Elizabeth 
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Kotzak, for budgetary reasons. The Assistant Director dismissed, 
however, that part of the charge which alleges that the 
unilateral abolition of the position itself violated the 
District's duty to bargain. 
GS-E-A argues in its exceptions that we should reconsider our 
prior decisions and hold that a decision to abolish a position 
for economic reasons is a mandatory subject of negotiation. It 
also excepts to the Assistant Director's decision that the 
transfer of unit duties to two employees who had been designated 
confidential did not violate the Act. The Assistant Director 
held that there was no violation in that respect because the two 
employees were still in the unit when the duties were transferred 
because the confidential designation was not then effective.-'' 
CSEA's main exception, however, relates to the Assistant 
Director's remedy. The Assistant Director ordered the duties 
which were improperly transferred restored to CSEA's unit. CSEA 
argues that the remedy is inadequate because it lacks a 
reinstatement and back pay award for Kotzak. 
The District has not taken exception to the Assistant 
Director's decision and it argues that CSEA's exceptions should 
be denied. 
For the following reasons, we affirm the Assistant 
Director's decision. 
•^ The duties were transferred in this respect in June 1991, but 
the confidential designation did not become effective pursuant to 
§201.7(a) of the Act until December 1991. 
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CSEA concedes that a position abolition for economic reasons 
has been held a nonmandatory subject of negotiation.-'' In 
urging us to reverse those prior decisions, CSEA argues that the 
decision to abolish a position for budgetary reasons should be 
mandatorily negotiable because it turns on labor costs. Having 
considered CSEA's arguments, we decline to reverse our long-
standing position on this issue. Notwithstanding the obvious 
impact a position abolition can have, and did have in this case, 
upon an employee's employment relationship, we remain convinced 
that a position abolition for economic reasons is primarily 
mission related and, therefore, a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiation. Accordingly, we deny CSEA's exceptions in this 
respect. 
We also affirm that part of the Assistant Director's 
decision which finds no violation in the reassignment of certain 
of Kotzak's duties pertaining to payroll and accounts receivable 
to the two confidential employees. When the charge was filed and 
litigated, the confidential designees were still in the unit 
because the designation was not in effect. Because there was no 
transfer of work out of the unit no basis was established to find 
a violation of the Act. CSEA could have filed a new charge or 
moved to amend this charge and reopen the hearing on it if on or 
after the effective date of the confidential designation the 
g/Spencer-Van Etten Cent. School Dist., 21 PERB K3015 (1988), 
aff rcr 20 PERB 54612 (1987); City School Dist. of the Citv of New 
RQChelle, 4 PERB 53060 (1971) . 
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District had the then nonunit confidential employees perform 
duties of the abolished position.-7 
Remaining for our consideration is CSEA's argument that the 
ALJ should have ordered Kotzak reinstated with back pay. 
GSEA is correct that the purpose of our remedial orders is 
to make parties whole for the wrong sustained by placing them, as 
nearly as possible, in the position they would have been in had 
the improper practice not been committed. But CSEA errs by 
focusing upon the individual most immediately affected by the 
transfer of duties as the basis for its remedial request. The 
violation committed runs not to the employee's personal statutory 
rights, but to the union's right, as representative of the 
collective unit's interests, to bargain regarding the loss or 
retention of exclusive unit work. The violation in this case 
centers on the unilateral transfer of duties out of the 
bargaining unit which is remedied by restoring the improperly 
transferred duties to the unit. Notwithstanding this general 
proposition, unit employees who are severed from employment as a 
result of the improper transfer of unit work would be entitled to 
reinstatement and back pay if the improperly transferred work was 
the equivalent of full-time employment. For example, if the 
-' We note, moreover, that this issue has been rendered largely 
academic by the Assistant Director's remedial order restoring the 
payroll and accounts receivable duties to the unit. 
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duties of Kotzak's position which were improperly transferred out 
of CSEA's unit amounted to the substantial equivalent of full-
time employment for her, a reinstatement order with accompanying 
back pay might very well have been appropriate as it is, for 
example, in the transfer of unit work effected by subcontract. 
However, in view of the Assistant Director's finding that a 
significant portion of Kotzak's duties were not improperly 
eliminated or transferred, a finding to which CSEA has not taken 
exception, a reinstatement and back pay order is not appropriate. 
For the reasons set forth above, CSEA's exceptions are 
denied and the Assistant Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Forthwith restore to a position or positions within the 
bargaining unit represented by CSEA the following 
duties which were formerly, and exclusively, performed 
by the bargaining unit position of computer operator: 
payroll, accounts payable, student accident reports 
data input, back-up, voter registration, student 
database input, trouble-shooting of the administrative 
data processing system, ordering supplies and security 
management. 
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2. Sign and post the attached Notice at all locations 
normally used to post notices of information to unit 
employees. 
DATED: September 21, 1992 
Albany, New York 
M .fr'VWU 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member (^  
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees of the Burnt-Hills-Ballston Lake Central 
School District in the bargaining unit represented by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Schenectady County Local 847, Burnt Hills-Ballston Lake CSD Unit, 
that the District: 
Will forthwith restore to a position or 
positions within the unit represented by the 
CSEA the following duties which were formerly 
and exclusively, performed by the bargaining 
unit position of computer operator: payroll, 
accounts payable, student accident reports data 
input, back-up, voter registration, student 
database input, trouble-shooting of the 
administrative data processing system, ordering 
supplies and security management. 
BURNT HILLS-BALLSTON 
. LAKE. .CENTRAL . SCHOOL. DISTRICT. 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3924 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Employer, 
-and-
SPECIAL INSPECTORS BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION,17 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Law 
Enforcement Officers has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
-''Special Inspectors Benevolent Association, the incumbent 
negotiating agent, has disclaimed any ongoing representational 
interest. 
Certification - C-3924 
- 2 -
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All Special Inspectors 
Excluded: Assistant Chiefs and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Law 
Enforcement Officers. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: September 21, 1992 . 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOCES EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL 
ASSOCIATION, NEA/NEW YORK, NEA, 
Petitioner, 




CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees7 Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the BOCES Educational Support 
Personnel Association, NEA/New York, NEA has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described 
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below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Helper, Registered Nurse, Braillist, Courier, 
Interpreter, Typist, Press Operator, Van 
Driver, Payroll Clerk, Account Clerk Typist, 
Employment Counselor, Custodial Worker, 
Secretary, Assistant Fleet Mechanic, AV 
Manager, Senior Account Clerk Typist, Aide 
(Teacher, Library, AV), Messenger, Clerk, 
Composing Typist, AV Repairperson, 
Stenographer, Account Clerk, Assistant Fleet 
Mechanic, Access Case Manager, Fleet Mechanic, 
In-School Suspension Monitor, Receptionist, 
Technology Specialist, Purchasing Clerk; 
Excluded: Administrators, Coordinators, Treasurer, 
Secretary to the District Superintendent, 
Secretary to the Coordinator of Employee 
Relations, Word Processing Manager, Word 
Processing Specialist, Computer Operator/ 
Programmer, Secretary to the Assistant 
Superintendent for Management Services, 
Secretary to the Assistant Superintendent for 
Instructional Services, Secretary to the 
Coordinator of Planning and Development, 
Building Maintenance Mechanic. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the BOCES Educational Support 
Personnel Association, NEA/New York, NEA. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
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compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: September 21, 1992. 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, C 'Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membeiy 
Eric JfSchmertz, Member 
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In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-394 6 




SPECIAL INSPECTORS BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION,17 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Law 
Enforcement Officers has been designated and selected by a 
-^Special Inspectors Benevolent Association, the incumbent 
negotiating agent, has disclaimed any ongoing representational 
interest. 
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majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All Special Inspectors 
Excluded: Assistant Chiefs and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Law 
Enforcement Officers. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement or an^7 Question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: September 21, 1992 
Albany, New York 
UuUtCs. 2f ^ 
WaJJfeer L. E i s e n b e r g , Member 
Ei^ic J . S c h m e r t z , Member 
